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Syllabus

THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES OF THE FORT
BERTHOLD RESERVATION v. WOLD
ENGINEERING, P. C., ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH DAKOTA
No. 84-1973.

Argued March 24, 1986-Decided June 16, 1986

Petitioner Indian tribe brought suit against respondent corporation (hereafter respondent) in a North Dakota state court for negligence and
breach of contract in connection with respondent's construction of a
water-supply system on petitioner's reservation. The trial court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that a North Dakota statute (Chapter 27-19)-which provides that jurisdiction of the State shall be extended over all civil claims
for relief that arise on an Indian reservation upon acceptance by Indian
citizens -disclaimed the unconditional state court civil jurisdiction North
Dakota had previously extended to tribal Indians suing non-Indians in
state court, and that Chapter 27-19 barred petitioner from maintaining
its suit in state court absent its waiver of sovereign immunity.
Held:
1. Because the federal statute governing state assumption of jurisdiction over Indian country, Pub. L. 280, was designed to extend the jurisdiction of the States over Indian country and to encourage state assumption of such jurisdiction, and because Congress specifically considered
the issue of retrocession but did not provide for disclaimers of jurisdiction lawfully acquired other than under Pub. L. 280 prior to 1968, such
disclaimers cannot be reconciled with the congressional plan embodied in
Pub. L. 280 and thus are pre-empted. Pp. 884-887.
2. The conclusion that the operation of the North Dakota jurisdictional
scheme in this case is inconsistent with federal law is reinforced by the
fact that it imposes an undue burden on federal and tribal interests in
Indian self-government and autonomy, as well as the federal interest in
ensuring access to the courts. Pp. 887-893.
364 N. W. 2d 98, reversed and remanded.
J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER,
MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, and POWELL, JJ., joined.
REHNQUIST, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and
STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 893.
O'CONNOR,

C. J., and

WHITE,

OCTOBER TERM, 1985
Opinion of the Court

476 U. S.

Raymond Cross argued the cause for petitioner. With
him on the brief were John 0. Holm and Christopher D.
Quale.
Gary H. Lee argued the cause and filed a brief for
respondents. *
JUSTICE O'CONNOR

delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner, Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold
Reservation, sought to sue respondent, Wold Engineering,
P. C. (hereafter respondent), in state court for negligence
and breach of contract. The North Dakota Supreme Court
held that Chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Century Code
(1974) disclaimed the unconditional state court civil jurisdiction North Dakota had previously extended to tribal Indians
suing non-Indians in state court. It ruled that under Chapter 27-19, petitioner could not avail itself of state court jurisdiction unless it consented to waive its sovereign immunity
and to have any civil disputes in state court to which it is a
party adjudicated under state law. 364 N. W. 2d 98 (1985).
The question presented is whether Chapter 27-19, as construed by the North Dakota Supreme Court, is repugnant to
the Federal Constitution or is pre-empted by federal Indian
law.
I
This is the second time this Court has been called upon to
address this jurisdictional controversy. See Three Affiliated
Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U. S. 138 (1984) (Three
Tribes I). Because the facts and procedural history of the
litigation were set forth in some detail in Three Tribes I, our
present recitation will be brief.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the Standing
Rock Sioux Tribe et al. by Reid Peyton Chambers, Donald J. Simon, and
Kevin A. Griffin; and for the Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians
by Kim Jerome Gottschalk.
Nicholas J. Spaeth, Attorney General, and Terry L. Adkins, Assistant
Attorney General, filed a brief for the State of North Dakota as amicus
curiae urging affirmance.
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Historically, Indian territories were generally deemed be-

yond the legislative and judicial jurisdiction of the state governments. See id., at 142. This restriction was reflected in
the federal statute which admitted North Dakota to the
Union, Enabling Act of Feb. 22, 1889, §4, cl. 2, 25 Stat. 677,
and was embodied in the form of jurisdictional disclaimers in
North Dakota's original Constitution. See N. D. Const.,
Art. XVI, §203, cl. 2 (1889). The pre-existing federal restrictions on state jurisdiction over Indian country were
largely eliminated, however, in 1953 with Congress' enactment of the Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, as amended,
28 U. S. C. § 1360, which is commonly known as Pub. L. 280.
Public Law 280 gave federal consent to the assumption of
state civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country and
provided the procedures by which such an assumption could
be made. See Three Tribes I, supra, at 143. As originally
enacted, Pub. L. 280 did not require the States to obtain the
consent of affected Indian tribes before assuming jurisdiction
over them, but Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1963
amended Pub. L. 280 to require that all subsequent assertions of jurisdiction be preceded by tribal consent. Pub. L.
90-284, §§401, 402, 406, 82 Stat. 78-80, codified at 25
U. S. C. §§ 1321, 1322, 1326.
As this Court explained in Three Tribes I:
"Even before North Dakota moved to amend its Constitution and assume full jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280,
the North Dakota Supreme Court had taken an expansive view of the scope of state-court jurisdiction over
Indians in Indian country. In 1957, the court held [in
Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d 432 (1957)] that
the existing jurisdictional disclaimers in the Enabling
Act and the State's Constitution foreclosed civil jurisdiction over Indian country only in cases involving interests
in Indian lands themselves." 467 U. S., at 143-144.
Although Vermillion v. Spotted Elk, 85 N. W. 2d 432 (1957),
was decided after the enactment of Pub. L. 280, the North
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Dakota Supreme Court made clear that it was confirming
pre-existing jurisdiction rather than establishing a previously
unavailable jurisdictional category. Id., at 435-436. See
also Three Tribes I, supra, at 150, n. 9.
That part of Vermillion that recognized jurisdiction over
non-Indians' claims against Indians impermissibly intruded
on tribal self-government and thus could not be sustained.
467 U. S., at 148. See also Fisher v. District Court, 424
U. S. 382 (1976); Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217 (1959).
But, as this Court in Three Tribes I affirmed, North Dakota's
recognition of jurisdiction over the claims of Indian plaintiffs
against non-Indian defendants was lawful because such jurisdiction did not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to
govern themselves and was not subject to Pub. L. 280's procedural requirements since the jurisdiction was lawfully assumed prior to that enactment. See 467 U. S., at 148-149,
151, n. 11.
In 1958, North Dakota amended its Constitution to authorize its legislature to provide by statute for the acceptance of
jurisdiction over Indian country, see N. D. Const., Art.
XIII, § 1, cl. 2, and in 1963, the North Dakota Legislature enacted Chapter 27-19. That Chapter provides, in pertinent
part:
"In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 280
...and [the amended] North Dakota constitution, jurisdiction of the state of North Dakota shall be extended
over all civil claims for relief which arise on an Indian
reservation upon acceptance by Indian citizens in a manner provided by this chapter. Upon acceptance the jurisdiction of the state is to the same extent that the state
has jurisdiction over other civil claims for relief, and
those civil laws of this state that are of general application to private property have the same force and effect
within such Indian reservation or Indian country as they
have elsewhere within this state." N. D. Cent. Code
§ 27-19-01 (Supp. 1985).

THREE AFFILIATED TRIBES v. WOLD ENGINEERING
877

881

Opinion of the Court

In subsequent cases, the North Dakota Supreme Court read
this provision to "completely disclaim" the state jurisdiction
recognized in Vermillion in cases in which the defendant was
an Indian, absent tribal consent to jurisdiction as provided by
statute. See, e. g., In re Whiteshield, 124 N. W. 2d 694
(1963). However, until the instant suit, the court never
squarely held that Chapter 27-19 also disclaimed the jurisdiction Vermillion lawfully recognized over cases in which an
Indian sued a non-Indian in state court for a claim arising in
Indian country. See Three Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 144-145.
Petitioner filed the instant suit against respondent in state
court for negligence and breach of contract in connection
with respondent's construction of a water-supply system on
petitioner's reservation. At the time the suit was filed, petitioner's tribal court did not have jurisdiction over such
claims. After counterclaiming for petitioner's alleged failure
to make payments on the system, respondent moved to dismiss petitioner's complaint, arguing that the state court
had no jurisdiction because petitioner has never consented to
state court jurisdiction over the Fort Berthold Reservation
under Chapter 27-19. The trial court dismissed the suit for
lack of jurisdiction, and the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal on appeal. 321 N. W. 2d 510 (1982).
In so doing, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
any residuary jurisdiction the North Dakota courts possessed
under Vermillion over suits by an Indian against a nonIndian arising in Indian country was "totally disclaimed"
when the North Dakota Legislature, "[u]nder the authority
of Public Law 280," instituted the consent requirement of
Chapter 27-19. 321 N. W. 2d, at 511-512. It concluded
that "we have no jurisdiction over civil causes of action arising within the exterior boundaries of an Indian reservation,
unless the Indian citizens of the reservation vote to accept jurisdiction." Id., at 512. The court also rejected petitioner's
federal and state constitutional challenges, relying in part on
the argument that the discrimination against Indian litigants
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embodied in Chapter 27-19 was authorized by Pub. L. 280
and was therefore insulated, under Washington v. Yakima
Indian Nation, 439 U. S. 463 (1979), from heightened scrutiny. See 321 N. W. 2d, at 512-513.
This Court granted certiorari. 461 U. S. 904 (1983). We
held that federal law did not preclude the state court from asserting jurisdiction over petitioner's claim. In particular,
we ruled that Pub. L. 280 neither required nor authorized
North Dakota to disclaim the jurisdiction it had lawfully exercised over the claims of Indian plaintiffs against non-Indian
defendants prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280. See Three
Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 150. Because the North Dakota
Supreme Court's interpretation of Chapter 27-19 and its accompanying constitutional analysis appeared to rest on a possible misunderstanding of Pub. L. 280, this Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case to allow the North Dakota
court to reconsider the jurisdictional questions in light of the
proper interpretation of the governing federal statute. Id.,
at 141.
On remand, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that
Chapter 27-19 terminated any residuary jurisdiction that
may have existed over claims arising in Indian country
brought by tribal Indians against non-Indians in state court.
364 N. W. 2d, at 104. It further held that state law barred
petitioner from maintaining its suit in state court absent its
waiver of its sovereign immunity in accordance with the statutory procedures. Id., at 103-104. Finally, the court rejected petitioner's due process and equal protection challenges. It stated that petitioner had not been denied a due
process right to access to the courts by action of the State,
reasoning that it was the Indian people who had deprived
themselves of access to state jurisdiction in declining to avail
themselves of the State's jurisdictional offer by waiving their
sovereign immunity. See id., at 106. The North Dakota
court then ruled that the jurisdictional disclaimer did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because, by virtue of the
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consent provision, "It]he statute does not treat [the Tribe]
less than equal, it treats them more than equal." Id., at 107.
We granted certiorari to examine petitioner's claims that
Chapter 27-19 violates the Federal Constitution and is preempted by federal Indian law. Although respondent at no
time objected to our consideration of the federal pre-emption
issue, and in fact briefed it on the merits, our review of the
proceedings below indicates that this question was not explicitly raised before, and was not decided by the North Dakota
Supreme Court. We have recognized that in such circumstances there is a "weighty presumption against review."
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U. S. 82, 87 (1985). See also Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 218-222 (1983). We believe, however, that this presumption has been overcome in this instance by a combination of circumstances.
First, respondent's failure to raise any challenge to our
consideration of the pre-emption issue, cf. Oklahoma City
v. Tuttle, 471 U. S. 808, 815-816 (1985), and its apparent
willingness to have the question decided, argues for review.
Second, this case has already been sent back to the North
Dakota Supreme Court once, and we are reluctant to further
burden that court by resolving less than all the federal questions addressed by the parties. Since we have twice had the
benefit of the Supreme Court of North Dakota's reasoning on
closely aligned issues, we do not believe that our consideration of the federal pre-emption issue is a disservice to that
court or to the litigants, or impairs our informed decision of
the issue.
Because we believe that the North Dakota law is preempted insofar as it is applied to disclaim pre-existing jurisdiction over suits by tribal plaintiffs against non-Indians for
which there is no other forum, absent the Tribe's waiver of
its sovereign immunity and consent to the application of state
civil law in all cases to which it is a party, we reverse.
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II
Our cases reveal a "'trend ...away from the idea of inherent Indian sovereignty as a[n independent] bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal pre-emption."' Rice
v. Rehner, 463 U. S. 713, 718 (1983) (quoting McClanahanv.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 172 (1973) (footnote omitted)). Yet considerations of tribal sovereignty,
and the federal interests in promoting Indian self-governance
and autonomy, if not of themselves sufficient to "pre-empt"
state regulation, nevertheless form an important backdrop
against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes
must be read. See, e. g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache
Tribe, 462 U. S. 324, 334 (1983); Rice v. Rehner, supra, at
718-719. Accordingly, we have formulated a comprehensive
pre-emption inquiry in the Indian law context which examines not only the congressional plan, but also "the nature of
the state, federal, and tribal interests at stake, an inquiry
designed to determine whether, in the specific context, the
exercise of state authority would violate federal law." White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U. S. 136, 145
(1980). In the instant case, this pre-emption inquiry yields
the conclusion that the legislative plan embodied in Pub. L.
280 forecloses North Dakota from disclaiming jurisdiction
over petitioner's suit, and further, that the state interest
advanced by the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme in this
context is overshadowed by longstanding federal and tribal
interests.
A
Public Law 280 represents the primary expression of federal policy governing the assumption by States of civil and
criminal jurisdiction over the Indian Nations. The Act was
the result of "comprehensive and detailed congressional scrutiny," Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S.423,
424, n. 1, 427 (1971), and was intended to replace the ad hoc
regulation of state jurisdiction over Indian country with general legislation, providing "for all affected States to come
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within its terms." S. Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 5
(1953). See also Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of
State Jurisdiction over Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L.
Rev. 535, 540-544 (1975). In examining the effect of comprehensive legislation governing Indian matters such as this,
"our cases have rejected a narrow focus on congressional intent to pre-empt state law as the sole touchstone. They
have also rejected the proposition that pre-emption requires
'an express congressional statement to that effect."' New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra, at 334 (quoting
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, supra, at 144)
(footnote omitted). See also Rice v. Rehner, supra, at 719.
Rather, we have found that where a detailed federal regulatory scheme exists and where its general thrust will be impaired by incompatible state action, that state action, without
more, may be ruled pre-empted by federal law. See, e. g.,
Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380
U. S. 685 (1965).
Given the comprehensiveness of the federal regulation in
this area of Indian law, our conclusion in Three Tribes I that
Congress generally intended to authorize the assumption, not
the disclaimer, of state jurisdiction over Indian country is
persuasive evidence that the instant disclaimer conflicts with
the federal scheme. See 467 U. S., at 150. But we need not
rest upon this conclusion alone, for Congress' specific treatment of the retrocession of previously assumed jurisdiction
permits no doubt that North Dakota's disclaimer is inconsistent with the requirements of Pub. L. 280.
As originally enacted, Pub. L. 280 plainly contemplated
that, if States chose to extend state court jurisdiction over
causes of action arising in Indian country, they would be
required to honor that commitment, for the Act made no provision for States to return any jurisdiction to the United
States. See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 370
(1982) (hereinafter Cohen). Congress' failure to provide for
the retrocession of jurisdiction assumed by the States is fully
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consistent with the purposes underlying Pub. L. 280: promoting the gradual assimilation of Indians into the dominant
American culture and easing the fiscal and administrative
burden borne by the Federal Government by virtue of
its control over Indian affairs. See Goldberg, supra, at
542-544. See also H. R. Rep. No. 848, 83d Cong., 1st Sess.,
3, 6 (1953). Were States permitted, at their option and at
any time, to retrocede all or part of the jurisdiction they had
assumed and to leave Indians with no recourse for civil
wrongs, the congressional plan of gradual but steady assimilation could be disrupted and the divestment of federal dominance nullified.
When Congress subsequently revisited the question of retrocession in the 1968 amendments, it provided that "[t]he
United States is authorized to accept a retrocession by any
State," 25 U. S. C. § 1323(a), but it specifically limited this
authorization to the retrocession of jurisdiction assumed
under Pub. L. 280 pursuant to the original 1953 version of the
statute. See ibid. (permitting retrocession of jurisdiction
"acquired by [the] State pursuant to the provisions of section
1162 of title 18, of the United States Code, section 1360 of
title 28, of the United States Code, or section 7 of the Act of
August 15, 1953 (67 Stat. 588), as it was in effect prior to its
repeal by subsection (b) of this section"). See also Exec.
Order No. 11435, 3 CFR 754 (1966-1970 Comp.) (giving Secretary of the Interior discretionary authority to accept retrocession of jurisdiction by a State); Goldberg, supra, at
558-559. This retrocession provision apparently was added
in response to Indian dissatisfaction with Pub. L. 280. See
Cohen 370. In light of this congressional purpose, the fact
that Congress did not provide for retrocession of jurisdiction
lawfully assumed prior to the enactment of Pub. L. 280 or of
jurisdiction assumed after 1968 cannot be attributed to mere
oversight or inadvertence. Since Congress was motivated
by a desire to shield the Indians from unwanted extensions of
jurisdiction over them, there was no need to provide for
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retrocession in those circumstances because the previously
assumed jurisdiction over Indian country was only lawful to
the extent that it was consistent with Indian tribal sovereignty and self-government, see, e. g., Williams v. Lee, 358
U. S. 217 (1959), and the jurisdiction assumed after 1968
could be secured only upon the receipt of tribal consent. See
25 U. S. C. § 1321.
North Dakota may not, and indeed has not attempted to,
rely on § 1323(a) as authority for its disclaimer of jurisdiction
over claims such as petitioner's because it did not assume
such jurisdiction under any of the provisions specified in
§ 1323(a), nor has the United States accepted the retrocession. We have previously enforced the procedural requirements and the jurisdictional provisions of Pub. L. 280 quite
stringently, consistent with our understanding that the
jurisdictional scheme embodied in that Act was the product
of a wide-ranging and detailed congressional study. See,
e. g., Kennerly v. District Court of Montana, 400 U. S., at
427. See also Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439
U. S., at 484 ("the procedural requirements of Pub. L. 280
must be strictly followed"); McClanahan v. Arizona State
Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 180. Accordingly, we conclude
that since North Dakota's disclaimer is not authorized by
§ 1323(a), it is barred by that section.
In sum, because Pub. L. 280 was designed to extend the
jurisdiction of the States over Indian country and to encourage state assumption of such jurisdiction, and because Congress specifically considered the issue of retrocession but did
not provide for disclaimers of jurisdiction lawfully acquired
other than under Pub. L. 280 prior to 1968, we must conclude
that such disclaimers cannot be reconciled with the congressional plan embodied in Pub. L. 280 and thus are pre-empted
by it.
B
Our consideration of the State's interest in disclaiming the
pre-existing, unconditional jurisdiction extended to tribal
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Indians suing non-Indian defendants, and in replacing it with
an extension of jurisdiction conditioned on the Tribe's waiver
of its sovereign immunity and its agreement to the application of state law in all suits to which it is a party, reinforces
our conclusion that Chapter 27-19 is inconsistent with federal
law. Simply put, the state interest, as presently implemented, is unduly burdensome on the federal and tribal
interests.
As the North Dakota Supreme Court explained, Chapter
27-19 was originally designed as a unilateral assumption of
jurisdiction over Indian country, which was intended to provide a means of enforcing contracts between Indians and nonIndians and a tribunal for trying tort actions, family law
matters, and "many [other] types of actions too numerous to
mention." 364 N. W. 2d, at 102, and n. 5. The North
Dakota Legislature added the consent provision to Chapter
27-19 as a compromise to "accommodate the will of the Indian
people." Id., at 103. Those Indians who opposed the assertion of state jurisdiction against them would not be subjected
to it absent consent, but neither would they be permitted to
enjoy state jurisdiction as plaintiffs absent consent to suit as
defendants. See id., at 107. Certainly, the State's interest
in requiring that all its citizens bear equally the burdens and
the benefits of access to the courts is readily understandable.
But here, federal interests exist which override this state
interest.
The federal interest in ensuring that all citizens have access to the courts is obviously a weighty one. See, e. g.,
CaliforniaMotor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U. S. 508, 510, 513-514 (1972); Bill Johnson's Restaurants,
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U. S. 731, 741, 742-744 (1983). This
Court and many state courts have long recognized that Indians share this interest in access to the courts, and that tribal
autonomy and self-government are not impeded when a State
allows an Indian to enter its court to seek relief against a nonIndian concerning a claim arising in Indian country. See,
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e. g., Three Tribes I, 467 U. S., at 148, and n. 7 (citing
authority). North Dakota conditions the Tribe's access to
the courts on its waiver of its tribal sovereign immunity and
agreement to the application of state civil law in all state
court civil actions to which it is or may be a party. These
conditions apply regardless of whether, as here, the Tribe
has no other effective means of securing relief for civil
wrongs. As the State concedes, even if the Tribe were to
have access to tribal court to resolve civil controversies with
non-Indians, it would be unable to enforce those judgments in
state court; thus, the Tribe cannot be said to have a meaningful alternative to state adjudication by way of access to other
tribunals in such cases. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 26, 27. Cf.
Lohnes v. Cloud, 254 N. W. 2d 430 (N. D. 1977). Respondent argues that the Tribe is not truly deprived of access to
the courts by the North Dakota jurisdictional scheme because
the Tribe could have unrestricted access to the State's courts
by "merely" consenting to the statutory conditions. We conclude, however, that those statutory conditions may be met
only at an unacceptably high price to tribal sovereignty and
thus operate to effectively bar the Tribe from the courts.
The North Dakota jurisdictional scheme requires the Tribe
to accept a potentially severe intrusion on the Indians' ability
to govern themselves according to their own laws in order to
regain their access to the state courts. The statute provides
that "[t]he civil jurisdiction herein accepted and assumed
[upon Indian consent] shall include but shall not be limited to
the determination of parentage of children, termination of
parental rights, commitments by county courts, guardianship, marriage contracts, and obligations for the support of
spouse, children, or other dependents." N. D. Cent. Code
§27-19-08 (Supp. 1985). Although these subjects clearly
encompass areas of traditional tribal control, see Fisher v.
District Court, 424 U. S., at 388-389; United States v.
Quiver, 241 U. S. 602 (1916), the North Dakota statute contemplates that state civil law will control in these areas. See
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§ 27-19-01. Respondent argues that Chapter 27-19 safeguards tribal self-government by also providing that any
tribal ordinance or custom "shall, if not inconsistent with the
applicable civil law of this state, be given full force and effect
in the determination of civil claims for relief pursuant to this
section." § 27-19-09. This provision plainly provides that
state law will generally control, however, and will merely be
supplemented by nonconflicting Indian ordinances or customs, even in cases that arise on the reservation, that involve
only Indians, and that concern subjects which are within the
jurisdiction of the tribal court.
This result simply cannot be reconciled with Congress' jealous regard for Indian self-governance.
See, e. g., New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U. S., at 334-335,
and n. 17 ("[B]oth the tribes and the Federal Government
are firmly committed to the goal of promoting tribal selfgovernment, a goal embodied in numerous federal statutes").
See also Fisher v. District Court, supra, at 388-389. "A
tribe's power to prescribe the conduct of tribal members has
never been doubted, and our cases establish that 'absent governing Acts of Congress,' a State may not act in a manner
that 'infringe[s] on the right of reservation Indians to make
their own laws and be ruled by them."' New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, supra, at 332 (quoting McClanahanv.
Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S., at 171-172).
Chapter 27-19's requirement that the Tribe consent to suit
in all civil causes of action before it may again gain access to
state court as a plaintiff also serves to defeat the Tribe's
federally conferred immunity from suit. The common law
sovereign immunity possessed by the Tribe is a necessary
corollary to Indian sovereignty and self-governance. See,
e. g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U. S. 49 (1978).
Of course, because of the peculiar "quasi-sovereign" status of
the Indian tribes, the Tribe's immunity is not congruent with
that which the Federal Government, or the States, enjoy.
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309
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U. S. 506, 513 (1940). Cf. also McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n, supra, at 173. And this aspect of tribal
sovereignty, like all others, is subject to plenary federal control and definition. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
supra, at 58. Nonetheless, in the absence of federal authorization, tribal immunity, like all aspects of tribal sovereignty,
is privileged from diminution by the States.
To be sure, not all conditions imposed on access to state
courts which potentially affect tribal immunity, and thus
tribal self-government, are objectionable.
For instance,
even petitioner concedes that its tribal immunity does not extend to protection from the normal processes of the state
court in which it has filed suit. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 7, 10-11
("The Three Affiliated Tribes believe it would be proper in
the interest of justice that they would be subject to discovery
proceedings and to proceedings that would insure a fair trial
to the non-Indian defendants"). Petitioner also concedes
that a non-Indian defendant may assert a counterclaim arising out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the principal suit as a setoff or recoupment. See id.,
at 6-7, 9. It is clear, however, that the extent of the waiver
presently required by Chapter 27-19 is unduly intrusive on
the Tribe's common law sovereign immunity, and thus on its
ability to govern itself according to its own laws. By requiring that the Tribe open itself up to the coercive jurisdiction of
state courts for all matters occurring on the reservation, the
statute invites a potentially severe impairment of the authority of the tribal government, its courts, and its laws. See,
e. g., Fisher v. District Court, supra, at 387-388.*
*The extent to which respondent's counterclaim may be used not only
to defeat or reduce petitioner's recovery, but also to fix the Tribe's affirmative liability has been the subject of some discussion in this case. See,
e. g., Tr. of Oral Arg. 6-11. We have no occasion to resolve this issue because the case comes to us before trial and we do not know the extent of
the counterclaim asserted by respondent.

OCTOBER TERM, 1985
Opinion of the Court

476 U. S.

Public Law 280 certainly does not constitute a "governing
Act of Congress" which validates this type of interference
with tribal immunity and self-government. We have never
read Pub. L. 280 to constitute a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity, nor found Pub. L. 280 to represent an abandonment
of the federal interest in guarding Indian self-governance.
As we explained in Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U. S. 373,
387-388 (1976):
"Today's congressional policy toward reservation Indians may less clearly than in 1953 favor their assimilation,
but Pub. L. 280 was plainly not meant to effect total
[N]othing in its legislative history
assimilation ....
remotely suggests that Congress meant the Act's extension of civil jurisdiction to the States should result in
the undermining or destruction of such tribal governments as did exist and a conversion of the affected tribes
into little more than 'private, voluntary organizations,'
United States v. Mazurie, 419 U. S. 544, 557 (1975)
.... The Act itself refutes such an inference: there is
notably absent any conferral of state jurisdiction over
the tribes themselves, and § 4(c), 28 U. S. C. § 1360(c),
providing for the 'full force and effect' of any tribal ordinances or customs 'heretofore or hereafter adopted by an
Indian tribe ... if not inconsistent with any applicable
civil law of the State,' contemplates the continuing vitality of tribal government." (Footnote omitted.)
Certainly, the 1968 amendments to Pub. L. 280 pointedly
illustrate the continuing congressional concern over tribal
sovereignty. The impetus for the addition of a consent requirement in the 1968 amendments was congressional dissatisfaction with the involuntary extension of state jurisdiction over Indians who did not feel they were ready to accept
such jurisdiction, or who felt threatened by it. See, e. g.,
S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 32 (1967) (views of
Sen. Ervin) ("Tribes have been critical of Public Law 280 because it authorizes the unilateral application of State law to
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all tribes without their consent and regardless of their needs
or special circumstances. Moreover, it appears that tribal
laws were unnecessarily preempted . . ."); Rights of Members of Indian Tribes: Hearing on H. R. 15419 and Related
Bills before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess., 25 (1968) (referring to tribal consent requirement as a
way to ensure that Indians are not "subjected" to state
courts' jurisdiction before they are ready).
In sum, the State's interest is overly broad and overly intrusive when examined against the backdrop of the federal
and tribal interests implicated in this case. See Rice v.
Rehner, 463 U. S., at 719. The perceived inequity of permitting the Tribe to recover from a non-Indian for civil
wrongs in instances where a non-Indian allegedly may not recover against the Tribe simply must be accepted in view of
the overriding federal and tribal interests in these circumstances, much in the same way that the perceived inequity of
permitting the United States or North Dakota to sue in cases
where they could not be sued as defendants because of their
sovereign immunity also must be accepted. Our examination of the state, tribal, and federal interests implicated in
this case, then, reinforces our conclusion that North Dakota's
disclaimer of jurisdiction over suits such as this cannot be
reconciled with the congressional plan embodied in Pub. L.
280.
The judgment of the North Dakota Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
with whom JUSTICE BRENNAN and
dissenting.
North Dakota law provides that in order for an Indian tribe
such as petitioner to avail itself of the jurisdiction of North
Dakota courts as a plaintiff, it must also accept the jurisdiction of those courts when it is properly named as a defendant
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in them. This Court holds that such a rule-which would
commend itself to most people as eminently fair-is preempted by federal law. To support this conclusion the Court
advances two arguments: first, pre-emption by Pub. L. 280,
and, second, the "overshadowing" of the state interest by
"longstanding federal and tribal interests." Ante, at 884.
Neither by themselves nor in the rather awkward juxtaposition in which the Court places them are these arguments
persuasive.
The Court's argument based on Pub. L. 280 consists of two
assertions: (1) Pub. L. 280 pre-empts Chapter 27-19's disclaimer of pre-existing jurisdiction because the federal statute establishes a "comprehensive" legislative plan to govern
Indian matters, and Chapter 27-19's disclaimer is incompatible with the plan's general purpose to authorize the assumption of state jurisdiction over Indian country, ante, at
884-885; and (2) the initial failure of Pub. L. 280 to authorize
a disclaimer of jurisdiction, combined with the subsequent
authorization of such disclaimer in the 1968 amendments with
respect to jurisdiction assumed pursuant to Pub. L. 280,
evidence a congressional intent to forbid the disclaimer of
jurisdiction assumed prior to the passage of Pub. L. 280.
Ante, at 885-887.
The Court provides no support for its assertion that Pub.
L. 280 establishes a "comprehensive" federal scheme that
pre-empts any state law that may inhibit the accomplishment
of its general purpose. The Court's citation to Kennerly v.
District Court of Montana, 400 U. S. 423, 427 (1971) (per
curiam), is unhelpful; the Court there was describing the
"comprehensive and detailed" scrutiny that Congress appeared to give in deciding whether or not to eliminate federal
barriers to state jurisdiction over Indian matters, and not the
nature of Pub. L. 280. In addition, the brevity of Pub. L.
280, its 1968 amendments, and the relevant legislative history belie the Court's assertion that these statutes establish a
"comprehensive" plan like statutes that occupy a given field
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Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U. S.

238, 248 (1984). Public Law 280 does little more than make a
general pronouncement that certain federal barriers to state
jurisdiction have been eliminated. See Act of Aug. 15, 1953,
ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 590. Nor does the legislative history,
the 1968 amendments, or their legislative history provide any
additions that transform the general pronouncement into a
"comprehensive" plan. See S. Rep. No. 699, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1953); Pub. L. 90-284, Title IV, §§402, 403, 82 Stat.
79; S. Rep. No. 721, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
There is also nothing inconsistent between the State's disclaimer of pre-existing jurisdiction and the purpose of Pub.
L. 280. Congress stated that Pub. L. 280 was designed to
accomplish two general purposes:
"First, withdrawal of Federal responsibility for Indian
affairs wherever practicable; and second, termination of
the subjection of Indians to Federal laws applicable to
Indians as such." S. Rep. No. 699, supra, at 3.
The statute's elimination of certain federal barriers to the assertion of state jurisdiction over Indian country was an important means of furthering these goals. But the statute's
complete silence on the disclaimer of state jurisdiction cannot
reasonably be taken to imply an intent to forbid such disclaimer. This is especially true with respect to jurisdiction
lawfully assumed before the passage of Pub. L. 280, since disclaimer of such jurisdiction would certainly have been entirely proper before passage of the Act.
Nor can any congressional intent to forbid the disclaimer of
jurisdiction asserted prior to the passage of Pub. L. 280 be
reasonably inferred from the subsequent authorization of
such disclaimer with respect to jurisdiction asserted pursuant
to Pub. L. 280. This Court has long recognized that federal
law has a "generally interstitial character," Richards v.
United States, 369 U. S. 1, 7 (1962), in the sense that Congress generally enacts legislation against the background of
existing state law. See, e. g., Burks v. Lasker, 441 U. S.
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471, 478 (1979), citing P. Bator, P. Mishkin, D. Shapiro, & H.
Wechsler, Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the
Federal System 470-471 (2d ed. 1973). An appreciation for
this traditional understanding of the nature of state power
does not render superfluous the congressional authorization
of disclaimer in the 1968 amendments to Pub. L. 280. See
Pub. L. 90-284, Title IV, §§ 402, 403, 82 Stat. 79. Since the
1968 amendments were generally designed to impose a limitation on the ability of state legislatures to assert jurisdiction
over Indian country, Congress could reasonably have intended the provision authorizing the disclaimer of previously
asserted jurisdiction to encourage such disclaimer with a concomitant retention of a more limited form of jurisdiction.
That the disclaimer provision referred only to jurisdiction
asserted pursuant to Pub. L. 280 says nothing about congressional intent as to jurisdiction lawfully asserted in some other
way. Given the traditional powers of state government, it
is unreasonable to interpret such silence as evidence of an
intent to forbid the States to disclaim jurisdiction asserted in
another way. I find the Court's pre-emption analysis to be
quite unconvincing.
I think the Court's reasoning supporting its conclusion that
federal and tribal interests "overshadow" the State's interest
in fair play for litigants fares no better than its reasoning
about Pub. L. 280. The requirement that a tribe consent to
the general civil jurisdiction of state courts as a quid pro quo
for access to those courts as a plaintiff seems entirely fair and
evenhanded to me. Nothing in Pub. L. 280 or any other federal statute requires a State to accept jurisdiction over Indian country in the first place. Nor has such an obligation
been created as a matter of federal case law dealing with the
Indians. To the contrary, all the cases and statutes with
which I am familiar speak only to the limitations on the assertion of jurisdiction over these matters. Thus, because Congress and this Court have left the States free to bar access
entirely by simply not asserting jurisdiction over Indian
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country at all, I do not see how any "federal interest" precludes them from establishing conditions on the assertion of
jurisdiction, and thereby on access to state courts, as North
Dakota has done here: the employment of the North Dakota
courts in matters in which the tribe has an interest shall not
be solely at the option of the tribe.
I think there is nothing in Pub. L. 280 nor in federal Indian
policy that prohibits North Dakota from applying its statute
in the manner in which it did in this case, and I therefore dissent from the Court's contrary conclusion.

